City of Columbus, Ohio - Page 19

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          the exception, the number of persons who took advantage of the              
          prepayment terms would appear to be irrelevant.                             
               Having decided that petitioner is not entitled to the                  
          benefits of the exception in section 1.148-1(b), Income Tax                 
          Regs.,7 we are left with the issue whether the prepayment                   
          produced a materially higher yield than the proposed bonds.  Sec.           
          148(b)(1).                                                                  
               Respondent argues that, by virtue of the discount                      
          arrangement with the State Fund, the City should be treated as              
          sharing in the investment yield of that fund, the rate of yield             
          being 8.25 percent.  Petitioner argues that the City and the                
          State Fund are separate entities and that such "sharing" implies            
          a partnership or combined entity which has no legal                         
          justification.  We agree with petitioner on this point.  There is           
          no doubt that the high rate of yield anticipated by the State               
          Fund was the foundation of the discount arrangement and no doubt            
          entered into the determination of the amount of the discount                
          which the State Fund decided to offer.  But it does not follow              
          that this circumstance justifies the conclusion that the City had           
          an ongoing share in the investment yield of the State Fund.  Our            

          No inference should be drawn that we would have ruled in favor              
          of petitioner if the exception did apply.  Under such                       
          circumstances, we would still have to decide whether respondent             
          should still prevail because of the broad discretionary authority           
          conferred upon her by sec. 1.148-10(e), Income Tax Regs., supra             
          p. 14.                                                                      




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