- 30 -
supra at 1571-1572; see United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S.
546, 550 (1973); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. United States, 955 F.2d
1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1992).
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
supra at 842-843, the Supreme Court stated the following:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of
the statute which it administers, it is confronted with
two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. [Emphasis
added; fn refs. omitted.]
Our primary inquiry in the case of a legislative regulation
is whether the interpretation or method prescribed therein is
within the delegation of authority. Regardless of whether the
regulation at issue is legislative or interpretive, it is
appropriate to ascertain whether the regulation harmonizes with
the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose in
order to determine whether the regulation carries out the
congressional mandate in a proper manner. United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co. 455 U.S. 16, 24-26 (1982); CWT Farms, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra at 801.
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