- 46 -
have a nonsensical result. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at
728. We held further that the plain meaning rule does not
preclude an examination behind the literal terms of the language
at issue if the lack of such an examination would compel an odd
result. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 728 (citing Public
Citizen v. United States, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989)).
We examined the legislative purpose and history of
percentage depletion to ascertain whether and to what extent the
statutory framework was consistent with a literal interpretation
of the regulation at issue. In so doing, we found that the plain
meaning of the regulation, as applied to the facts before us in
Exxon Corp., was against clear and longstanding congressional
intent.
Accordingly, we found that in computing allowance for
percentage depletion, it was unreasonable for Exxon to determine
its 1979 "gross income from the property" for sales of natural
gas, after the gas was transported away from the wellhead, by the
method provided for in the last sentence of section 1.613-3(a),
Income Tax Regs., the representative market or field price
method, where those prices resulted in a "gross income from the
property" five times Exxon's actual contract sales revenue.
In the instant case, however, the only clear and consistent
congressional intent expressed with respect to the possession tax
credit regime is the encouragement of U.S. business operations in
U.S. possessions. We do not find that the application of the
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