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In ignoring these exchanges, we merely follow a well-
established principle of law, viz., that in tax cases
it is axiomatic that we look through the form in which
the taxpayer has cloaked a transaction to the substance
of the transaction. See, e.g., Republic Petroleum
Corp. v. United States, 613 F.2d 518, 524 (5th Cir.
1980); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d
652, 657 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing cases). As the
Supreme Court stated some years ago in Minnesota Tea
Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 58 S. Ct. 393, 82 L.Ed.
474 (1938), "A given result at the end of a straight
path is not made a different result because reached by
following a devious path." 302 U.S. at 613, 58 S. Ct.
at 394. The check exchanges notwithstanding, the
Battelsteins satisfied their interest obligations to
Gibraltar by giving Gibraltar notes promising future
payment. The law leaves no doubt that such a surrender
of notes does not constitute payment for tax purposes
entitling a taxpayer to a deduction. [Id. at 1184.]
The Court of Appeals rejected the taxpayers' reliance on
Burgess v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 47 (1947). The Court of Appeals
determined that even if Burgess constituted good law, it was
limited to cases where the purpose of a subsequent loan was not
apparent (i.e., whether it was to finance interest payments on a
previous loan for which deductions are being claimed, or whether
it was to fulfill some other unrelated objective). The Court of
Appeals held that "If the second loan was for the purpose of
financing the interest due on the first loan, then the taxpayer's
interest obligation on the first loan has not been paid as
Section 163(a) requires; it has merely been postponed."
Battelstein v. IRS, supra at 1184.
In Wilkerson v. Commissioner, 655 F.2d at 982, the Court of
Appeals relied on Battelstein v. IRS, supra, and denied the
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