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interest provisions because of the particular timing of their tax
payments, there would have been no need for the Court to include
such a recital in its decisions." (Emphasis added.) This
argument by petitioners is entirely conjectural and is not
supported by the documentation on which counsel relies. In fact,
the recital that no increased interest under section 6621(c) was
due in the Miller cases was an express term of the settlement
documents in those cases and apparently included in the decisions
for completeness and accuracy. There is nothing on the record in
the present consolidated cases, or in the Court's opinions in
Estate of Satin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-435, or Fisher
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-434, or in any of the material
submitted to us in these consolidated cases that would indicate
that the Millers were "otherwise subject to the penalty interest
provisions". Petitioners' argument is based on a false premise.
We find that petitioners and Miller were treated equally to
the extent they were similarly situated, and differently to the
extent they were not. Miller foreclosed the applicability of the
section 6621(c) increased rate of interest in his cases, while
petitioners concede it applies in their cases. Petitioners
failed to accept a piggyback settlement offer that would have
entitled them to the settlement reached in the Miller cases, and
also rejected a settlement offer made to them prior to trial of a
test case. In contrast, Miller negotiated for himself and
accepted an offer that was essentially the same as the Plastics
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