7
Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986); Estate of Mason
v. Commissioner, supra at 656-657.
Petitioner argues that the advances from the various
accounts were loans to Finnimore and that the deposits to the
Ticketline account were repayments on the loans. The existence
of a loan is a question of fact to be decided on the basis of all
the facts. Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 91 (1970). Some
of the relevant factors are: Whether the parties were dealing at
arm's length; whether the loan was in writing; whether the loan
provided for interest; whether repayments were made; whether
there was a business purpose for making the loan; and whether
payments are not contingent on profits. See Beaver v.
Commissioner, supra; Arlen v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 640, 648
(1967).
Petitioner had no promissory note or repayment schedule for
the alleged loans. Petitioner submitted a document that he
claimed was a loan ledger. The document does not mention loans
to or repayments from Finnimore and does not establish that
petitioner made loans to Finnimore. Petitioner claims that he
began charging Finnimore interest in 1988, but petitioner
reported no interest income from the alleged loans. Petitioner
knew that he would not be repaid if Finnimore did not resell the
tickets, and we find that ticket sales were the only source of
repayment from Finnimore.
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