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by any reasonable method, which in her opinion clearly refects
the taxpayer’s income. Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661,
693-694 (1989); Harbin v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 373, 377 (1963).
Based on facts adduced at petitioner’s criminal trial, respondent
determined that petitioner received unreported bribe income for
the years in issue. It is clear that bribes received are
includable in gross income. Sec. 61(a); sec. 1.61-14(a), Income
Tax Regs. It is also well settled that, except where otherwise
provided in the Internal Revenue Code or Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure, the burden of proof rests with
petitioner. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111
(1933). Thus, petitioner bears the burden of proving that he did
not receive the bribes in question during the years in issue and
that respondent’s determinations are incorrect.
A. Collateral Estoppel
Respondent first argues that petitioner, by his conviction
in Federal District Court on the count of conspiracy to bribe, is
collaterally estopped from denying that he received the bribes in
question. We disagree.
The Court has recognized that a criminal conviction can
operate as collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil case. Arctic
Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 68 (1964). However, the
judgment in the prior action will act as an estoppel only as to
those issues or elements, upon the determination of which the
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