- 13 -
of proving that he did not receive unreported bribe income during
the years in issue, but rather spends the bulk of his time
arguing that respondent did not meet her burden of proving fraud.
Petitioner states in his brief:
Respondent enjoys no presumption of correctness in
her assessment. Instead, * * * [petitioner] is
presumed not to have received * * * [the bribes] unless
Respondent affirmatively establishes (1) that * * *
[petitioner] took the bribes and, if so, (2) how much
he received * * *.
Petitioner’s understanding of who bears the burden of proof is
skewed. Despite respondent’s burden of proving fraud, Rule
142(b), petitioner still bears the burden of proof regarding the
deficiency. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, supra.3 Viewing
the procedural posture of this case in an incorrect light,
petitioner offers little evidence other than his own testimony,
which is insufficient to overcome respondent's determination of
income tax deficiencies. Petitioner’s testimony was at complete
odds with the hard evidence. For example, petitioner claims that
his trail of investigation led him to the tax returns of Cynwyd
Investment and Saligman Capital, which opened the door for
investigation of the Cynwyd Group’s returns. However, a review
of petitioner’s work chronology finds that result impossible.
Petitioner first examined the 1977 and 1978 returns of the Rita
Cooper Trust and the Harvey Saligman Trust. He found a problem
3 In regard to the burden of proof in fraud cases, see
Franklin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-184.
Page: Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011