-29--29-
advance did not constitute a loan because the repayment was to
come solely from the stadium net revenues is not persuasive.
Respondent argues that there is no evidence that the stadium, if
built, would have generated sufficient income to repay the
$10 million. Estimates during the Irwindale negotiations,
however, indicated that revenues during the first year of the
stadium’s operation would be approximately $24 million.
Alternatively, respondent argues that petitioners had income
in 1987, 1988, or 1989, as a result of the Raiders' being
discharged of their obligation to repay Irwindale. Petitioners
contend that the Raiders’ obligation to repay was not discharged
in 1987, 1988, or 1989 because the Raiders and Irwindale
continued in their negotiations until at least 1990,
contemplating the repayment of the initial $10-million advance.
In general, gross income includes all income from whatever
source derived, including income from the discharge of
indebtedness. Sec. 61(a)(12). The gain to the debtor from such
discharge is the resultant freeing up of his assets that he would
otherwise have been required to use to pay the debt. See United
States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
Respondent has alleged several events that she claims
constitute a discharge of the Raiders’ obligation to repay in
1987, 1988, or 1989.
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