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As we stated above, our goal is to construe the Convention
according to the "genuine shared expectations of the contracting
parties". Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d at 568. While the
meaning attributed to treaty provisions by Government agencies
charged with their negotiation and enforcement can be very
helpful to us, and we give great weight to that meaning, United
States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369, deference is not the same as
blind acceptance. See Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 115
(1984), revd. on other grounds 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
affd. 479 U.S. 27 (1986). There is no authority for the
proposition that a court construing a convention must follow the
interpretation suggested by our Government when that
interpretation runs contrary to what the Court concludes was the
intent of the contracting parties. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has noted that "courts interpret treaties for themselves,"
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961), and that the
construction given by Government agencies is not conclusive.
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, supra at 184. The
deference afforded depends upon the degree to which the
interpretation proffered by respondent, as the official U.S.
position, is reasonable, unbiased, and consistent with what
appear to be the circumstances surrounding the convention.
Coplin v. United States, supra. As discussed below, other
evidence in the record undermines the plausibility of
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