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RUWE, J., dissenting: I disagree with the majority for
reasons already well stated by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Miller v. United States, 65 F.3d 687 (8th Cir.
1995). Since there is no need to repeat those reasons, I shall
confine myself to addressing several aspects of the majority
opinion not addressed in Miller.
First, I do not believe that the conference committee's use
of the word "generally" supports the majority's reasoning. The
conference committee report states: "Personal interest also
generally includes interest on tax deficiencies". H. Conf. Rept.
99-841, at II-154 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) 1, 154. The
majority seizes upon the word "generally" and reasons that
Congress could not have intended to declare that all interest on
"income" tax deficiencies is personal interest. However, in the
conference committee report, the word "generally" modifies "tax
deficiencies", not "income tax deficiencies". The term "tax
deficiencies", which also includes estate and gift tax
deficiencies, is obviously broader than the term "income tax
deficiencies". Congress statutorily excluded some interest on
tax deficiencies from the "personal interest" definition by
specifically providing in section 163(h)(2)(E) that interest on
estate taxes imposed by section 2001 is, in certain
circumstances, not personal interest. Therefore, the use of the
word "generally" in the conference committee report was both
technically correct and consistent with the regulation's holding
that all interest on individual income tax deficiencies is
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