- 7 - First, the jurisdictional point may be dealt with summarily. Once the Court, as here, has jurisdiction, it may not thereafter be divested of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Main-Hammond Land Trust v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 942, 956 (1951), affd. 200 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1952); Browning v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1974-80. Second, petitioners' position is based upon the untenable assumption that there was a valid closing agreement to begin with. In our judgment, no valid closing agreement was even entered into. The closing agreement here involved was signed by the Associate Chief, NYC Appeals, who had no authority to do so on behalf of the Commissioner. Delegation Order No. 97 provides that "Chiefs and Associate Chiefs of Appeals Offices * * * are hereby authorized in cases under their jurisdiction (but excluding cases docketed before the United States Tax Court) to enter into and approve a written agreement with any person relating to the Internal Revenue tax liability of such person * * * for a taxable period or periods ended prior to the date of agreement and related specific items affecting other taxable periods." (Emphasis added.) Delegation Order No. 97 (Rev. 19), 47 Fed. Reg. 19842 (May 7, 1982), was 2(...continued) decision against them, petitioners obviously seek to prevent the Commissioner from assessing a deficiency against them based upon the closing agreement, because a closing agreement standing alone arguably may not give the Commissioner the right to make an assessment absent a waiver by petitioners. Cf. sec. 6213(a).Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011