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First, the jurisdictional point may be dealt with summarily.
Once the Court, as here, has jurisdiction, it may not thereafter
be divested of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Main-Hammond Land Trust
v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 942, 956 (1951), affd. 200 F.2d 308 (6th
Cir. 1952); Browning v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1974-80.
Second, petitioners' position is based upon the untenable
assumption that there was a valid closing agreement to begin
with. In our judgment, no valid closing agreement was even
entered into. The closing agreement here involved was signed by
the Associate Chief, NYC Appeals, who had no authority to do so
on behalf of the Commissioner.
Delegation Order No. 97 provides that "Chiefs and Associate
Chiefs of Appeals Offices * * * are hereby authorized in cases
under their jurisdiction (but excluding cases docketed before the
United States Tax Court) to enter into and approve a written
agreement with any person relating to the Internal Revenue tax
liability of such person * * * for a taxable period or periods
ended prior to the date of agreement and related specific items
affecting other taxable periods." (Emphasis added.) Delegation
Order No. 97 (Rev. 19), 47 Fed. Reg. 19842 (May 7, 1982), was
2(...continued)
decision against them, petitioners obviously seek to prevent the
Commissioner from assessing a deficiency against them based upon
the closing agreement, because a closing agreement standing alone
arguably may not give the Commissioner the right to make an
assessment absent a waiver by petitioners. Cf. sec. 6213(a).
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