- 20 -
Finally, petitioner claims that he cannot be taxed on the
item in question because he did not actually receive it, and it
would have been illegal for him to have received it. See
Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394
(1972). Petitioner argues that he was prohibited from receiving
the item under (1) New York law and (2) an order issued by his
employer, the New York Attorney General, prohibiting Department
of Law employees from engaging in private practice. We do not
agree that the New York law or Attorney General rule cited by
petitioner would make it illegal for petitioner to receive the
fee that he waived to Hester. New York Code of Professional
Responsibility, rule 2-107(A), which covers legal fee splitting,
does not invalidate petitioner's fee-sharing agreements with the
Lipsig firm because (1) we assume Hester consented to the
agreements, as evidenced by the statements made in her affidavit
supporting the petition for a compromise order, and (2)
petitioner contributed to the legal work in an amount sufficient
to satisfy rule 2-107(A). See Benjamin v. Koeppel, 626 N.Y.S.2d
982, 985-986 (1995) (referring attorney contributed to the legal
work by merely interviewing the client, evaluating the case,
discussing the case with the representing firm, and attending one
meeting between client and firm). N.Y. Jud. sec. 474 does not
prohibit petitioner from collecting fees; rather it prescribes
the procedural method for obtaining fees, which petitioner failed
to follow as he had assigned his portion of the fee. Finally,
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