Joseph Baldwin Campbell - Page 15

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            distribution in 1992; petitioner received that distribution                                  
            regardless of whether he held a lease on the 270 acres.9                                     
            Petitioner's argument is wholly without merit.                                               
                  The Court recognizes the possibility that petitioner may                               
            have incurred some pecuniary damages as a result of his inability                            
            to farm the leased land during the year at issue.  Moreover, the                             
            Court understands that petitioner may harbor feelings of                                     
            inequitable treatment surrounding his relinquishment of what he                              
            regarded as tax-free farming income and the subsequent receipt by                            
            him of a taxable per capita distribution from the casino                                     
            operations.  Although the Court may sympathize with petitioner's                             
            quandary, this Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks                            
            general equitable powers.  Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7                              
            (1987); Hays Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 436 (1963), affd. 331                            
            F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1964); see sec. 7442.  The Court has no                                   
            authority to disregard the express provisions of statutes adopted                            
            by Congress, even where the result in a particular case may seem                             
            harsh.  See, e.g., Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d                                

                  It is notable that petitioner did not produce any evidence                             
            to show that his lease was still valid in 1992 (i.e., had not                                
            been validly terminated by the tribal council in 1991).  This may                            
            be one of the issues to be resolved in the arbitration of                                    
            petitioner's dispute with the tribal council.  The validity of                               
            the lease is made moot by this Court's determination that the                                
            existence of the lease has no bearing on the taxability of the                               
            subject per capita distribution.  Nevertheless, petitioner failed                            
            to prove on this record that the lease was valid during the year                             
            at issue.  On this record, it appears that the tribal council                                
            terminated the lease pursuant to the terms of the lease.                                     

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