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agree. John's position in the Florida courts was not that there
were no support provisions in the agreement; rather, John made a
legal argument that the agreement was nonmodifiable because it
contained support provisions and a complete disposition of
property rights.
Regardless of how we construe John's argument in support of
his motion to dismiss, the application of judicial estoppel for
which Faye argues also depends upon whether the Florida courts
ruled that the Stipulation and Final Judgment, including the
portion referring to the monthly payments to Faye, constituted a
settlement of property rights. John contends, among other
things, that the Florida courts never made a ruling favorable to
John on that position.11 Resolution of this issue requires a
thorough review of the Florida State court litigation.
We begin with Faye's October 6, 1981, Motion to Set Aside
Property Settlement Agreement and to Cancel Deed, which requested
relief pursuant to rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure. This rule allows a party to obtain relief from a
final judgment for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct
11John also argues that it is "entirely possible that, while
the periodic payments may not be alimony for purposes of 5 F.S.A.
� 61.14, they still are for purposes of IRC �� 71 and 215. * * *
It may well be that state and Federal law definitions of alimony
are simply different." John therefore maintains that the
doctrine of judicial estoppel would not apply, since his position
in the Florida State courts would not necessarily be inconsistent
with the one he has asserted here. Given our resolution of the
case, we need not address this contention.
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