Thomas M. and Christine A. Fries - Page 19

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          "necessary first assets".  Texas Farm Bureau v. United States,              
          725 F.2d at 314.  Moreover, National also used the advance to               
          acquire Action, a capital asset.                                            
               11.  Failure of the Corporation To Repay on the Due Date or            
               Seek a Postponement                                                    
               The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated in In             
          re Lane that "This factor and the * * * intent of the parties               
          factor are, we believe, the most telling of the Mixon factors".             
          In re Lane, 742 F.2d at 1317.  National made no attempt to repay            
          its obligation to petitioner, nor did it ever seek to defer                 
          payment or restructure the note as it did with the Action note.             
          See Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d at 849.                                    
               Having applied the foregoing factors to the facts of this              
          case, and after careful consideration of those factors which                
          support opposing conclusions, we think it is evident that the               
          advance was a contribution to capital and not a bona fide debt.             
          Whatever petitioner's subjective intent regarding the                       
          contribution at issue, the preceding analysis demonstrates that             
          he could not reasonably have expected repayment on the terms of             
          the Fries note at the time it was executed.  Moreover, his intent           
          did not comport with that of National, or with the economic                 
          reality of creating a true debtor-creditor relationship.  We                
          hold, therefore, that petitioners may not claim a bad debt                  
          deduction under section 166 for the advance petitioner made to              







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