Sprint Corporation and Subsidiaries, f.k.a. United Telecommunications, Inc. - Page 32

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          Enters. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 1 (1993) (gas company);           
          Kansas City S. Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 242 (1992)             
          (railroad); Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.              
          1990-505 (electric company); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.                    
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-35 (telephone company).  For                  
          Federal tax purposes, if the generally accepted method of                   
          accounting of a taxpayer is made compulsory by a regulatory                 
          agency, and the method clearly reflects income, it is virtually             
          presumed to be valid for Federal tax purposes.  Commissioner v.             
          Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 15 (1974).  The FCC accounted for              
          drop and block in account No. 232 until 1984, when it was                   
          accounted for in account No. 242.1 or 242.3.  Respondent looks to           
          the administrative justifications for such changes.  Although               
          there may have been legitimate and persuasive reasons for the               
          administrative change in accounting by the FCC, as well as some             
          industry support, we do not need to reach that issue.  It is not            
          for us today to decide whether the action of the FCC was valid,             
          justified, or authorized.                                                   
               Instead the analysis begins with the plain meaning of the              
          statute, and for reasons which follow, ends there.  Respondent              
          contends that the class lives have never changed; that is,                  
          account No. 242 has always been 15-year public utility property.            
          That is only one-half of the analysis, for we must also apply               
          those class lives to property as they would have been applied on            
          January 1, 1981.  The statute, in relevant part, provides that              
          “`present class life’ means the class life (if any) which would             



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