- 32 -
(1980), affd. 689 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). Likewise, we have
allowed the use of an accounting method that was challenged by
the Commissioner, when the taxpayer's method clearly reflected
income and the Commissioner's method did not. See Rotolo v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1500, 1514 (1987). We also have allowed
the consistent application of accounting methods that were
authorized by the Code or the underlying regulations. See RLC
Indus. Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 457, 491-492 (1992),
affd. 58 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1995).
When a taxpayer challenges the Commissioner's authority
under section 446(b), we inquire whether the accounting method in
issue clearly reflects income. The answer to this question does
not hinge on whether the taxpayer's method is superior to the
Commissioner's method, or vice versa. Id. at 492; see also Brown
v. Helvering, supra at 204-205. Instead, the answer must be
found by analyzing the unique facts and circumstances of the
case. Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v. Commissioner, supra;
Peninsula Steel Prods. & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
1029, 1045 (1982).
Although it is not dispositive of our analysis, we believe
that a critical fact to consider is whether the taxpayer is
consistently utilizing a recognized method of accounting that
comports with GAAP, and that is prevalent in the industry.
See Wilkinson-Beane, Inc. v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 352, 354
(1st Cir. 1970), affg. T.C. Memo. 1969-79; RLC Indus. Co. & Subs.
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