DHL Corporation and Subsidiaries - Page 45

                                        - 131 -                                       
          show that the effect of the advertising was so limited.                     
          Petitioners have not shown that or that DHLI bore more of the               
          cost than an arm’s-length licensee would have borne.19                      
               Petitioners bear the burden of showing that existence of an            
          arm’s-length price (value) or the absence of it in this instance            
          and have failed to do so.  See Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,            
          96 T.C. at 354.  Accordingly, we hold that upon the sale of the             
          trademark by petitioners to DHLI/MNV and/or its successor(s) no             
          setoff or reduction of the $100 million value is warranted under            
          section 1.482-2(d)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs.                                 
               2.  Respondent's Alternative Argument--the Alstores Doctrine           
               Our last consideration regarding the trademark valuation               
          involves respondent’s alternative argument.  Respondent contends            
          that DHL’s right to use the trademark after the sale represented            
          additional consideration received by DHL on the sale.  This                 
          concept derives from Alstores Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 46              

               19  Petitioners also made the argument that even if DHLI was           
          not considered to be the developer, the sec. 482 regulations                
          would permit respondent to allocate or set off the portion of               
          assistance DHLI provided toward the value of the intangible.  We            
          note that respondent has not attempted such an allocation or                
          setoff, and it does not appear that respondent may be compelled             
          to do so.  Even if such an allocation or setoff were appropriate,           
          as we have already explained, petitioners have not provided a               
          means by which such an allocation or setoff could be rationally             
          determined.                                                                 
               Petitioners have chosen to be bound by the less detailed and           
          inclusive 1968 version of the sec. 482 regulations that apply to            
          intangibles, but they used examples from the revised version to             
          support their argument on these points.  We suspect that                    
          petitioners’ resort to latter-day regulations was motivated by              
          the examples provided under the 1968 regulations which we found             
          did not fit the factual pattern presented in this record.                   



Page:  Previous  121  122  123  124  125  126  127  128  129  130  131  132  133  134  135  136  137  138  139  140  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011