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parties assert--and we agree--that the outcome of this case
depends upon the interpretation of the phrase “the foster care
provider's home” in section 131(b)(1)(B).5
Petitioners' Position: Any House We Own in Which Others Live Is
Our “Home”
Petitioners' position is that each of the four properties is
“the foster care provider's home”--even though they do not live
in three of those “homes”. Petitioners claim that their position
is supported by the plain meaning of section 131(b)(1)(B).
Petitioners note that the properties are dwellings of the type
commonly referred to as “houses” or “homes”. Petitioners also
note that they own, and provide foster care in, those homes.6
Therefore, according to petitioners, in ordinary, everyday
speech, all the homes are their (i.e., the foster care
providers') homes, and all such homes therefore satisfy the
statutory standard--whether or not they reside in them.
Respondent's Position: Meaning of Foster Family Home
5 We note that if the payments at issue were "difficulty of
care payments", a similar interpretative question would arise,
because sec. 131(c)(1)(A)(ii) requires that difficulty of care
payments be compensation for certain care provided "in the home
of the foster care provider".
6 The stipulation of facts describes petitioners' activities
as "adult care", not as "foster care". The parties' pleadings
and briefs do not raise the issue whether the care provided in
the properties qualified as "foster care" for purposes of sec.
131, or whether petitioners were "foster care providers" with
respect to that care. For purposes of the argument, we assume
that all the care provided was "foster care" and that petitioners
were "providers" of that care, within the meaning of sec. 131.
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