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Respondent's position, by contrast, is that only the Morris
Street property--the only property in which petitioners reside--
can be “the foster care provider's home”. Unlike petitioners'
position, respondent's position is not based on any assertedly
plain meaning of the statute. Instead, respondent asks us to
adopt an interpretation of the term “foster care provider's home”
that is based on a specialized definition of the term “foster
family home” used in section 131(b)(2). Respondent asserts that
“in a foster care context” or “among state and local governmental
agencies” foster family home means “the family residence of a
licensed foster care provider in which the licensee is the
primary provider of foster care.”
Employing this definition, respondent asserts that only the
Morris Street property could be a foster family home, because
only that property was petitioners' family residence. Respondent
then concludes that only the Morris Street property could be the
“foster care provider's home”--because any house that can be the
“foster care provider's home” (i.e., the place where the foster
individual must be cared for, under section 131(b)(1)(B)) must
also be a “foster family home” (i.e., the place where the foster
individual must live, under section 131(b)(2)).
As discussed below, we agree with respondent's ultimate
conclusion that the payments made with respect to the properties
other than the Morris Street property are not excluded under
section 131(a). Nevertheless, we do not accept the specialized
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