- 17 -
is his (or her) "principal place of employment", rather than his
“residence”. See Mitchell v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 578 (1980);
Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557 (1968).
We believe that the authorities under section 162 do not
undermine our conclusion that “home” requires a residential
connection for purposes of section 131. It is a fundamental
policy of Federal income tax law that a taxpayer should not be
entitled to a deduction for “personal” expenses, such as the
ordinary expenses of everyday living. This policy is evidenced
by section 262(a), which states that "Except as otherwise
expressly provided * * * no deduction shall be allowed for
personal, living, or family expenses.” The interpretation of
“home” to mean "principal place of business" for purposes of
section 162(a)(2) has been based upon this policy. See Kroll v.
Commissioner, supra at 562.
By contrast, we do not ascertain any legislative intent
underlying section 131--or any policy of the statute as a whole--
that either permits or requires us to depart from the general
rule that our interpretation be governed by the plain meaning of
the statutory language.14 To the extent we are able to determine
14 See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
U.S. 564, 571 (1982)): “The plain meaning of legislation should
be conclusive, except in the `rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters’”; see also United
States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534,
543-544 (1940).
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