FMR Corp. and Subsidiaries - Page 47

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               length of which can be estimated with reasonable                       
               accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject                  
               of a depreciation allowance.  Examples are patents and                 
               copyrights.  An intangible asset, the useful life of                   
               which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance                  
               for depreciation.  No allowance will be permitted                      
               merely because, in the unsupported opinion of the                      
               taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful                    
               life.  * * *                                                           

          The standard for deciding whether an intangible is depreciable              
          under section 167 was enunciated in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.            
          United States, 507 U.S. 546, 566 (1993), as follows:                        

               a taxpayer [must] prove with reasonable accuracy that                  
               an asset used in the trade or business or held for the                 
               production of income has a value that wastes over an                   
               ascertainable period of time * * *                                     

          The availability of a depreciation deduction is primarily a                 
          question of fact, id. at 560, on which the taxpayer bears the               
          burden of proof.  Id. at 566.                                               
               Petitioner contends (in the alternative) that the                      
          expenditures it incurred in launching the RIC's should be                   
          amortized over an average useful life of 2.2 years.  Petitioner             
          argues that the recovery period of 2.2 years is determined by the           
          average life of initial investments in a new RIC and is similar             
          to the recovery of bank acquisition expenditures allocable to the           
          deposits in the acquired bank over the period in which these                
          deposits can be shown to decline in value to the acquirer.  See             
          Citizens & S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463 (1988), affd.              
          919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990).                                             




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