Maude G. Furman, Donor, Deceased, and Estate of Maude G. Furman, Deceased, Robert G. Furman, Executor - Page 22

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               (d) The earning capacity of the company.                               
               (e) The dividend-paying capacity.                                      
               (f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or                      
               other intangible value.                                                
               (g) Sales of the stock and the size of the block of                    
               stock to be valued.                                                    
               (h) The market price of stocks of corporations                         
               engaged in the same or a similar line of business                      
               having their stocks actively traded in a free and open                 
               market, either on an exchange or over-the-counter.                     
               [Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. at 238-239.]                             
          Because valuation may not be reduced to the rote application of             
          formulas, and because of the imprecision inherent in determining            
          fair market value of stock that lacks a public market (and the              
          Solomon-like pronouncements that often follow), we again remind             
          the parties that these matters are better resolved by agreement             
          rather than trial by ordeal in which conflicting opinions of the            
          experts are pitted against each other.  See Estate of Hall v.               
          Commissioner, supra; Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512              
          (1967); see also Buffalo Tool & Die Manufacturing Co. v.                    
          Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441 (1980).                                           
               As is customary in valuation cases, the parties rely                   
          primarily on expert opinion evidence to support their contrary              
          valuation positions.  We evaluate the opinions of experts in                
          light of the demonstrated qualifications of each expert and all             
          other evidence in the record.  Anderson v. Commissioner, supra;             
          Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 561 (1986).  We have broad             
          discretion to evaluate "`the overall cogency of each expert's               
          analysis.’"  Sammons v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir.           
          1988) (quoting Ebben v. Commissioner, 783 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir.           
          1986), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1983-200),                



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