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issue, there is no evidence before us of where the Lockes resided
at the time the partnership interests were purchased. Although
statements in briefs do not constitute evidence, Rule 143(b);
Viehweg v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1248, 1255 (1988), respondent
has not suggested that another State's law should apply.
Therefore, we apply the laws of New York to ascertain the nature
of Mrs. Locke's interest, if any, in Mr. Locke's partnership
investments.
New York law, unlike that of community property states, does
not entitle each spouse to a present vested interest in so-called
marital property during marriage.3 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law sec.
236(B)(5) (McKinney 1986); Schurm v. Union Natl. Bank, 455
N.Y.S.2d 532, 534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). New York thus permits
each spouse to hold, control, encumber, or dispose of separate
3
The concept of marital property is reflected in New
York's Domestic Relations Law. Under the equitable distribution
provisions marital property is broadly defined as "all property
acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage * * *
regardless of the form in which title is held". N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Law sec. 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986); see O'Brien v. O'Brien,
489 N.E.2d 712, 715 (N.Y. 1985). In contrast, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
sec. 236(B)(1)(d) (McKinney 1986), provides a narrow enumeration
of what constitutes separate property. Because equitable
distribution applies only to the distribution of property in
divorce and similar matrimonial actions, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law sec.
236(B)(5), supra, it does not purport to alter New York's common-
law rules of property. Schurm v. Union Natl. Bank, 455 N.Y.S.2d
532, 534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
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