Therese Hahn - Page 20

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          legislative history provides little guidance).12  Accordingly,              
          respondent's appeal to legislative history is unavailing.                   
                    b.  Potential for Abuse                                           
               Respondent also speculates about the potential for abuse in            
          the situation where the surviving spouse furnished the entire               
          consideration for the jointly held property.  Respondent posits             
          that the estate of the deceased joint tenant has an "election" to           
          purposely fail to carry its burden of proving that the survivor             
          furnished any of the consideration for the joint interest.  This            
          would result in 100 percent of the property being included in the           
          decedent's gross estate under section 2040(a), and, according to            
          respondent, a corresponding step-up in basis for 100 percent of             
          the property for the survivor, with no concurrent increase in               
          estate tax (because of the unlimited marital deduction).                    
          Respondent argues that Congress could not have intended this                
          result, and, therefore, the 1981 amendment impliedly repealed the           
          effective date of section 2040(b)(1).                                       
               Again, respondent's argument fails to establish either an              
          irreconcilable conflict or that the later act covers the whole              
          subject of the earlier one.  Moreover, respondent simply                    
          misapprehends the operation of the burden of proof in this                  

               12Even if it did support respondent's argument, we would               
          hesitate to resort to legislative history to discern Congress'              
          intent, as we find no ambiguity in the statute as written.  See             
          Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992) (appeals to                   
          legislative history are well taken only to resolve statutory                
          ambiguity).                                                                 




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