Norwest Corporation and Subsidiaries, Successor in Interest to United Banks of Colorado, Inc., and Subsidiaries, et al. - Page 84

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          Circuit might have reached a similar conclusion even without the            
          taxpayer’s concession to the Government’s assumption.  We attach            
          little significance to the language to which petitioner directs our         
          attention.  Walgreen Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner, supra, does not           
          support petitioner’s argument.                                              
               JFM, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, supra, is also inapposite.          
          In that case, among other things, we had to determine the                   
          classification under Rev. Proc. 87-56 of gasoline pump canopies and         
          related assets.  We determined that class 57.0 (and 57.1)                   
          specifically included gasoline pump canopies.  We rejected the              
          Commissioner’s attempt to classify the assets under the broad               
          definition of “Land Improvements” in class 00.3, on the basis that          
          such class was a “catchall” provision, which specifically excluded          
          assets “explicitly included” in other classes.  Petitioner draws our        
          attention to the following statement in JFM, Inc.:  “It is clear            
          that classes 57.0 and 57.1 were intended to cover all possible types        
          of real or personal property used in marketing petroleum products”.         
          We made that statement in the context of rejecting the                      
          Commissioner’s class 00.3 classification, which excludes assets             
          described in other classes, and we do not read that statement as            
          establishing any priority between class 57.0 and 00.11.                     
               Petitioner also relies on Rev. Rul. 95-52, 1995-2 C.B. 27,             
          arguing that it shows that the recovery period of furniture can be 5        
          years because, under the circumstances in the ruling,  furniture is         
          included in class 57.0.  It is true that, in the ruling, the                
          Commissioner held that some furniture is in class 57.0.   The               




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