- 5 -
respondent simply should have increased the amount of
petitioners' distributive share of partnership losses flowing
from the favorable adjustments at the partnership level for 1989
and 1990. Instead, respondent recharacterized petitioners'
distributive share of the adjusted partnership losses (as well as
petitioners' share of partnership losses previously reported on
their returns for those years) as passive in notices of
computational adjustment issued for 1989 and 1990, resulting in
deficiencies. However, as an affected item requiring partner
level factual determinations, the recharacterization of such
losses was not properly subject to computational adjustment.
Sec. 6230(a)(2)(A)(i); see Estate of Quick v. Commissioner,
supra.
Respondent argues that this Court correctly declined to
order refunds for overpayments of tax in our Opinion. We agree,
but for the sake of clarity, we deem it necessary to discuss our
rationale in greater detail than we did previously.
The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may
exercise our jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by
Congress. See sec. 7442; Judge v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175,
1180-1181 (1987); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529
(1985). We have jurisdiction to decide whether we have
jurisdiction. Pyo v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 626, 632 (1984).
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011