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corporation are unavailing under the facts of this case.
Petitioners cite no legal authority and argue that the issue
in this case is entirely a question of fact. They maintain that
the dispatch services were performed pursuant to contracts which
the service recipients had with Ruckman, Inc., not with Mrs.
Ruckman individually; that Mrs. Ruckman did not and could not
perform all of the specific duties encompassed in providing
dispatch services; that both Mr. Ruckman and Mrs. Ruckman, as
well as their two adult children on occasion, actually performed
the dispatch services, but only through and on behalf of Ruckman,
Inc., using the corporation's facilities to do so.5
We believe the parties' dispute requires us to decide
whether Ruckman, Inc., or one or both of petitioners was the true
earner of the dispatch income. We agree in part with respondent
that the assignment of income doctrine6 is raised herein or, more
specifically, the recurrent issue of determining the true earner
of income as between a corporation and its service-performing
agent or shareholder. In these circumstances, because two
important income tax principles compete--namely, income must be
5In their petition, petitioners make the further assertion
that for the years in issue they were "not themselves engaged in
business other than as employees of the corporation [Ruckman,
Inc.]". Perhaps sensing some of the difficulties of that
position, petitioners on brief do not anywhere use the term
"employee" to characterize their relationship with Ruckman, Inc.
6See, e.g., United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 449
(1973); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-740 (1949);
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
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