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personally and taxpayer's personal use of proceeds support
conclusion that taxpayer rather than his corporation was true
earner). Perhaps most telling, although the dispatch payments
from Bennett Logging were reported as income on Ruckman, Inc.'s
returns in 1989 and 1990, the same payments were reported in 1991
on petitioners' joint return as Mrs. Ruckman's self-employment
income as a dispatcher. Petitioners have not asserted, nor is
there any evidence to suggest, that there was any change in the
contractual relationships among Bennett Logging, petitioners, or
Ruckman, Inc., between 1990 and 1991.8 We believe the conclusion
is inescapable that petitioners ignored the corporate existence
of Ruckman, Inc., with respect to the earning of income from
dispatch services. For these same reasons, we do not believe the
evidence can support a finding that either petitioner acted as
an agent of Ruckman, Inc., with respect to the earning of the
dispatch income. Accordingly, we conclude that Ruckman, Inc.,
did not have the right to direct and control either petitioner in
any meaningful sense with respect to the dispatch income.9
8The other payments received in 1991 for dispatch services,
from Happy Trucking, were not reported on either petitioners' or
Ruckman, Inc.'s return.
9We note that as officers of Ruckman, Inc., petitioners may
have been employees of the corporation pursuant to sec.
3121(d)(1). However, the services they may have rendered in
their capacity as officers are distinguishable from the dispatch
services rendered to third parties, with which we are here
concerned. See Idaho Ambucare Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 57
F.3d 752, 755-756 (9th Cir. 1995); Rev. Rul. 82-83, 1982-1 C.B.
151.
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