Bill L. and Patricia M. Spencer - Page 34

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          in order to have basis in the corporate indebtedness.  Mr.                  
          Spencer further testified that he was "very familiar with what              
          the documents needed to say."  In light of such advice and                  
          knowledge, we find it significant that Mr. Spencer did not follow           
          through with all of the necessary steps.  Based on our thorough             
          review of the evidence contained in the record, we conclude that,           
          in substance, SSI sold certain operating assets directly (1) to             
          SPC-SC, in exchange for $270,000, in cash and a $900,000                    
          promissory note,26 and (2) to SPC-FL, in exchange for a                     
          $1,150,000 promissory note.  Accordingly, we find that there is             
          no direct indebtedness between the S corporations and                       
          petitioners.27  It follows that payment by SPC-SC and SPC-FL to             
          SSI and SCNB was not on petitioners' behalf.                                

          26   Consideration for the assets consisted of $270,000 in cash             
          plus a $900,000 promissory note, for a total purchase price of              
          $1,170,000.  SPC-SC borrowed $250,000 of the cash paid at closing           
          from SCNB.  The source of the remaining $20,000 is not clear.               
          Thus, at the very least, SPC-SC paid $1,150,000 ($1,170,000 less            
          $20,000) in exchange for the SSI's South Carolina operating                 
          assets.                                                                     
          27   As we find no direct indebtedness, we need not reach the               
          question of whether there was the requisite "economic outlay".              
          See Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206, 217 (1988),             
          affd. 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989); Prashker v. Commissioner, 59            
          T.C. 172 (1972); Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762, 770-771               
          (1968).  Furthermore, because of our finding with respect to the            
          substance of the transactions in issue, we need not consider                
          petitioners' contentions concerning the consequences of the so-             
          called back-to-back sales transactions.  Petitioners' position              
          regarding the so-called back-to-back sales transaction is                   
          dependent on a finding that the substance of these transactions             
          is equivalent to the stipulated form--an argument that we                   
          considered and rejected.                                                    




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