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Petitioners fail both requirements of this test. First,
there is no evidence that Crestmark directed or controlled Boehm
in any meaningful sense. To the contrary, it is obvious that
Crestmark was Boehm’s alter ego, with no employees other than
Boehm and no office other than petitioners’ personal residence.
There is no evidence that during the year at issue, Crestmark had
any activity apart from receiving funds from and disbursing funds
on behalf of the individual petitioners.
Second, there is no evidence of the existence between Mowrey
and Crestmark of any contract or similar indicium recognizing
Crestmark’s controlling position with regard to Boehm.
Accordingly, we conclude that Boehm, rather than Crestmark,
actually controlled the earning of the amounts allegedly paid to
Crestmark with respect to Boehm’s services.
Because petitioners have filed a joint income tax return,
their tax is computed on their aggregate income. See sec.
4(...continued)
Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We
need not reconcile any differences in the legal tests, as we
would reach the same result under either test. See Haeri v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-20.
In the context of determining the identity of a taxpayer’s
employer, this Court has also held that it is necessary to
examine all the facts and circumstances, distinguishing cases
such as Johnson that--like the instant case--involve the issue of
whether compensation paid by the recipient of personal services
is income to the individual workers or their personal service
corporations. See Leavell v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 140, 148-155
(1995).
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