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VII. Enforceability of Piggyback Agreements
Petitioners contend that the piggyback agreements executed
by nontest case petitioners should be set aside on the ground
that Messrs. Sims and McWade fraudulently induced nontest case
petitioners to execute piggyback agreements by misrepresenting
the status of the Thompson and Cravens cases.115 In the
alternative, petitioners contend that the piggyback agreements
should be set aside on the ground that Messrs. Sims' and McWade's
failure to disclose the Thompson and Cravens settlements before
the trial of the test cases resulted in a breach of contract.
Mr. Sticht contends that enforcement of the piggyback agreements
would result in manifest injustice on the ground that Messrs.
Sims and McWade used the piggyback agreements as a means to
proceed to trial under what Mr. Sticht calls the "sporting theory
of justice".
Mr. Sticht raised additional contract arguments in posttrial
Motions for Release From Piggyback Agreement that he filed on
behalf of nontest case petitioners Richard B. and Donna G.
Rogers, Anthony E. and Carol A. Eggers, and John L. and Terry E.
115 Nontest case petitioners Ronald L. and Mattie L.
Alverson executed their piggyback agreement in June 1985--well
before Mr. McWade had negotiated the Thompson and Cravens
settlements. Nontest case petitioners Anthony E. and Carol A.
Eggers, John L. and Terry E. Huber, Stanley C. and Sharon A.
Titcomb, and Richard B. and Donna G. Rogers executed piggyback
agreements in late November 1986--about the time that Mr. McWade
began settlement discussions with Messrs. Thompson and Cravens.
Nontest case petitioners Norman W. and Barbara L. Adair executed
their piggyback agreement in March 1987--well after Mr. McWade
had negotiated the Thompson and Cravens settlements.
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