Jerry and Patricia A. Dixon, et al - Page 214




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          Huber.  Mr. Sticht contends that Mr. Seery's apparent conflict of           
          interest, at a time when Mr. Seery represented nontest case                 
          petitioners Rogers, Eggers, and Huber, provides a basis for                 
          releasing nontest case petitioners from their piggyback                     
          agreements.                                                                 
               Respondent contends that Messrs. Sims' and McWade's failure            
          to disclose the Thompson and Cravens settlements did not rise to            
          the level of failure to perform a contractual duty owed to the              
          nontest case petitioners.  Respondent further contends that the             
          piggyback agreements should be enforced on the ground that the              
          nontest case petitioners were not prejudiced by Messrs. Sims' and           
          McWade's misconduct.116                                                     
          Respondent also filed objections to Mr. Sticht's Motions for                
          Release From Piggyback Agreement.  In short, respondent contends            
          that the validity of the piggyback agreements is not adversely              
          affected by either Mr. Seery's alleged conflict of interest or              
          the events occurring during the trial of the test cases.                    
          A.   Principles of Contract Law                                             
               Although the piggyback agreements in dispute are titled                
          "Stipulation of Settlement For Tax Shelter Adjustments", we have            
          noted that such agreements do not reflect a settlement or                   


          116  Respondent did not address the enforceability of the                   
          piggyback agreements in respondent's opening brief in the belief            
          that it was premature to address the question pending the Court's           
          decision whether the Government misconduct in the trial of the              
          test cases constituted a structural defect.  By order dated                 
          Feb. 27, 1998, the Court directed respondent to address the                 
          question in respondent's reply brief, and respondent did so.                

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