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justify setting aside the piggyback agreements. Accordingly, we
will decline to avoid or rescind the piggyback agreements.
Even if we were to conclude that Messrs. Sims' and McWade's
failure to disclose the Thompson and Cravens settlements
constituted a breach of the piggyback agreements that would
justify their rescission or cancellation, petitioners would not
be entitled to a new trial. In due course, petitioners would be
ordered to show cause why their cases should not be decided
consistently with Dixon II. See, e.g., Krause v. Commissioner,
99 T.C. 132 (1992); Acierno v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-441;
Karlsson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-432; Bokum v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-21, affd. 992 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.
1993). Considering the entire record in these cases, we are
convinced that nontest case petitioners inevitably would be bound
by the Court's opinion in Dixon II.
2. Mr. Seery's Purported Conflict of Interest
We likewise reject Mr. Sticht's contention that the
piggyback agreements should be set aside on the ground that
Mr. Seery had a conflict of interest when he executed the
piggyback agreements. The short answer to Mr. Sticht's
contention is that Judge Goffe did not find that Mr. Seery had a
conflict of interest. Judge Goffe merely indicated that Mr.
Seery's motion to change the place of trial, filed November 7,
1986, gave rise to the possible inference that Mr. Seery was
engaged in dual representation of both Mr. Kersting and Kersting
program participants. Similarly, Mr. Seery's motions to withdraw
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