- 296 -
3. Rejection of Mr. Izen's Argument for Entry of Decision
on the Basis of Thompson Decisions
Mr. Izen contends that, pursuant to the piggyback
agreements, petitioners are entitled to entry of decision
consistent with the decisions entered in the Thompson cases. In
Gridley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-210, we rejected this
argument on the ground that nontest cases petitioners who signed
piggyback agreements agreed to be bound by the Court's opinion in
Dixon II as opposed to a specific decision entered in a
particular test case. Consistent with our analysis in Gridley v.
Commissioner, supra, we reject Mr. Izen's argument.
VIII. Mary Carter Agreements
At common law, a plaintiff had only one cause of action
against joint tort-feasors; therefore a plaintiff's release of
one joint tort-feasor would release all the joint tort-feasors.121
120(...continued)
that the Rogerses may rescind this piggyback agreement on the
ground that it was never filed with the Court. We reject
Mr. Sticht's argument as contrary to this Court's recent holding
in Dorchester Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320 (1997)
(settlement agreement is binding even though it has not been
filed as a stipulation with the Court). Moreover, we are
satisfied that the Rogerses are bound by a piggyback agreement
executed by Mr. Seery and Mr. McWade and filed with the Court in
Aaronson v. Commissioner, docket No. 17445-82, on Dec. 1, 1986,
at a time when the Rogerses were parties to that consolidated
docket.
121 See Note, "The Mary Carter Agreement--Solving the
Problems of Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions", 47 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1393, 1395-1396 (1974). This note is referenced in
d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 895 (9th Cir.
1977), one of the few cases in which the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has addressed Mary Carter Agreements (MCA's),
thereby meriting special attention.
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