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holding in Dixon II that the disputed promissory notes did not
create genuine indebtedness for tax purposes, it was not a direct
financial benefit in the sense that Judge Goffe's opinion is not
dispositive of the question whether Mr. Thompson's notes are
enforceable against him for State law purposes. Unlike MCA's
with Sliding Scale Clauses that provide settling defendants with
an immediate financial reward for large verdicts against
nonsettling defendants, Mr. Thompson's reward was a moral victory
at best. Any financial stake the Thompsons did have in the
outcome of the test cases is at least one long step removed from
the distinct and immediate financial stake a settling defendant
normally has under a Sliding Scale Clause in an MCA.
Considering all the facts and circumstances, we hold that
the family resemblances between Mary Carter agreements and the
Thompson and Cravens settlements do not bar the Court from
reinstating its decisions in the test cases.
IX. Mr. Sticht's Motion To Sever Case and for Entry of Decision
or Alternatively To Sever Case and Set for Trial
On June 9, 1998, Mr. Sticht filed a Motion to Sever Case and
for Entry of Decision; Or Alternatively to Sever Case and Set for
Trial on behalf of Joe A. and JoAnne Rinaldi in docket No. 7205-
94. The Rinaldis' case at docket No. 7205-94 concerns the
Rinaldis' tax liabilities for 1990 and 1991 and is based upon a
notice of deficiency that was issued after the disclosure of the
misconduct in the trial of the test cases. Because the Rinaldis
did not sign a piggyback agreement in docket No. 7205-94, Mr.
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