- 47 -
In sum, whereas paragraph 4 of the 1985 piggyback agreements
states that a decision will be entered in the piggyback case
following entry of decision in the test cases, paragraph 3 of the
post-1985 piggyback agreements states that a decision will be
entered in the piggyback case once the decision in the test cases
becomes final.25 See Gridley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-
210. Unlike 1985 piggyback agreements, post-1985 piggyback
agreements state (at paragraph 7) that petitioners agree to be
bound to the Court's holding in the test cases respecting the
applicability of increased interest under section 6621(c) on any
underpayment of tax of more than $1,000. Further, while 1985
piggyback agreements make no reference to additions to tax, post-
1985 piggyback agreements state (at paragraph 8) that petitioners
are not liable for additions to tax for negligence for any year
before the taxable year 1982.26
25 Despite this distinction, respondent did not move for
entry of decision--upon entry of decisions in the Kersting test
cases in early 1992--in any of the cases in which Kersting
petitioners had executed the 1985 version of the piggyback
agreement. Respondent has taken the position that no decisions
should be entered in any of the piggyback cases until the
decisions in the test cases become final. Cf. Abatti v.
Commissioner, 859 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1988), affg. 86 T.C. 1319
(1986).
26 Although the record does not reveal why post-1985
piggyback agreements limit respondent's concession of additions
to tax for negligence to taxable years before 1982, a plausible
explanation for selecting 1982 as the line of demarcation would
be that the Tax Court had released its opinion in Pike v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 822 (1982), in May 1982, putting taxpayers
on notice for 1982 and later taxable years that Mr. Kersting's
programs did not generate legitimate interest deductions.
Page: Previous 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011