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our own examination of the evidence in the record. Lukens v.
Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Silverman
v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1974-285); Ames v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-87. Where
experts offer divergent estimates of fair market value, we decide
what weight to give these estimates by examining the factors they
used in arriving at their conclusions. Casey v. Commissioner, 38
T.C. 357, 381 (1962). We have broad discretion in selecting
valuation methods, Estate of O'Connell v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d
249, 251 (9th Cir. 1981), affg. on this issue and revg. in part
T.C. Memo. 1978-191, and the weight to be given the facts in
reaching our conclusion because “finding market value is, after
all, something for judgment, experience, and reason”, Colonial
Fabrics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1953),
affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated January 22, 1951.
Moreover, while we may accept the opinion of an expert in its
entirety, Buffalo Tool & Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980), we may be selective in the use of any
part of such opinion, or reject the opinion in its entirety,
Parker v. Commissioner, supra at 561. Finally, because valuation
necessarily results in an approximation, the figure at which this
Court arrives need not be one as to which there is specific
testimony if it is within the range of values that may properly
be arrived at from consideration of all the evidence. Silverman
v. Commissioner, supra at 933; Alvary v. United States, 302 F.2d
790, 795 (2d Cir. 1962).
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