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and word. Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N.C. 173, 176, 66 S.E.2d
777, 779 (1951). Technical words are presumed to have been used
in their technical sense unless the other language of the will
evidences a contrary intent, in which case the words will be
given their ordinary and popular meaning. Kale v. Forrest, 278
N.C. 1, 6, 178 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1971). "[T]he use of particular
words, clauses or sentences must yield to the purpose and intent
of the testator as found in the whole will." Id.
Petitioner argues that Mrs. Fagan's will is ambiguous in
that Article II states that the payment of both administrative
costs and Federal estate taxes is to come from the residue, but
that the purpose is to not diminish her son's bequest by Federal
estate taxes. It is petitioner's position that Mrs. Fagan's
intent was to relieve her son's share only of Federal estate
taxes. Petitioner also points to the second sentence in Article
III, which reads: "This bequest is not to be diminished because
of any federal estate taxes", as exonerating the bequest to
decedent only from Federal estate tax. In addition, petitioner
argues that Mrs. Fagan did not intend the term "gross estate" in
Article III in a technical sense but in the sense opposite to
that of "net estate"; in other words, meaning "not reduced by
federal estate tax". On the basis of the foregoing, petitioner
maintains that decedent's share of Mrs. Fagan's estate should be
reduced by one-half of the administrative expenses of that
estate.
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