- 6 - Respondent's position is that the term "gross estate" was meant in the technical sense used for Federal estate tax purposes and that Mrs. Fagan intended for decedent to receive one-half of all of the property in which she had an interest at the time of her death. The only diminution was that resulting from the instruction in Article I to pay her debts. Respondent points to Article II as clearly stating Mrs. Fagan's intent that her son's share not be decreased by either the Federal estate tax or the administrative costs, in that she instructed that those items be paid from the residuary estate, and his portion was a specific bequest, not part of the residue. Petitioner's interpretation of Mrs. Fagan's will would render void her direction that "all costs of administration be paid from the residuary portion of my estate". Paying the costs out of the residue does not contradict or interfere with the purpose of not diminishing decedent's share by Federal estate taxes. Paying such costs out of the residue gives effect to the first sentence of Article II and of Article III. Although, under this construction, the term "gross estate" does not totally coincide with the term as used on the Federal estate tax return, to wit, assets before deduction of debts, charging administrative costs to the residue is more consistent with that meaning. Moreover, no language in Mrs. Fagan's will expresses an intent contrary to the use of "gross estate" as a technical term. The final clause in the first sentence of Article II, referring only to estate taxes, and similar limiting language inPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011