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that he had been deprived of additional capital contributions
that he had made to USI in the amount of $2,671,000. These
injuries clearly constitute economic injuries.
Petitioner’s restated complaint also alleged that USI caused
him to lose the fair value of his earning capacity. This
allegation parallels a portion of petitioner's complaint alleging
breach of contract. It appears that any such injury was to
petitioner's lost ability to take advantage of the contractual
"earn-out" provisions, rights that arose out of and were
dependent on petitioner's contract with USI. Even if the jury
award compensated petitioner for this alleged harm, it would not
constitute a personal injury within the ambit of section
104(a)(2). See Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116, 126
(1994) (compensatory damages for compromised economic rights that
arise from a contract are not excludable under section
104(a)(2)), affd. in part, revd. in part on another issue 70 F.3d
34 (5th Cir. 1995); Baca v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-632.
Petitioner’s restated complaint also alleged, without
elaboration, damage to his reputation and credit rating. The
record, however, does not show that evidence was presented in the
USI litigation regarding such injuries or that the damages were
awarded by reason of such harms. The mere mention of a
particular personal injury in a complaint, without more, does not
serve to bring a recovery for damages within the ambit of section
104(a)(2). See Kightlinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-357
(a contrary rule “would improperly expand the scope of section
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