- 17 - 104(a)(2) because the * * * [personal injury] language could easily be included in every complaint, even if such a claim were only a ‘throwaway’ claim”). In closing arguments at the third jury trial, petitioner’s counsel characterized petitioner’s injuries as damages suffered “by reason of giving up his businesses”; petitioner’s counsel made no argument for compensatory damages for any other type of injury. The jury instructions contain no reference to any injuries other than economic harms. The trial court instructed the jury in relevant part as follows: Therefore, if you find that * * * [petitioner] has been damaged, you should award * * * [petitioner] an amount of damages equal to the difference in value between what * * * [petitioner] gave USI and the value of what he received from USI in return. Standing alone, the fact that damages are measured in economic terms does not compel the conclusion that the injury redressed is economic rather than personal, for economic loss may be the best available measure of a personal injury. Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987), affg. 87 T.C. 236 (1986). In the case at hand, however, we believe that the harm which was measured by economic factors was in fact an economic injury. See Kightlinger v. Commissioner, supra (concluding that “economic factors were not merely used as a yardstick to measure the extent of the injury; rather, they were the harm for which petitioner received his compensation”). In sum, petitioners have failed to prove that the compensatory damages awarded on petitioner’s common-law fraudPage: Previous 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011