- 28 -
issory note nor interest as suggested by the respondent.)
A second alternate way of looking at the assis-
tance payment based on the receipt that it was a con-
tingent payment on the claim which would have to be
repaid at the time of settlement or judgement. Since
Dupont vigorously contested liability before the end of
1992, thus there was a clear possibility that a re-
payment would be required. There was no assurance the
petitioner could retain the funds. It could not have
been an out right partial payment since there was a
good chance it would have to be returned. [Reproduced
literally.]
Respondent counters that the $150,000 assistance payment
that Mr. Henry received from du Pont in 1992 is income for that
year. In support of that position, respondent argues on brief
that
the payment in question was not restricted and was not
subject to repayment. It was in the nature of a par-
tial payment which would be accounted for in the final
settlement or judgment, as it was in this case. The
petitioner had every claim of right to this money under
the principles of North American Oil Consolidated v.
Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
* * * * * * *
Except as otherwise provided in the Code, a tax-
payer must include in gross income "all income from
whatever source derived." I.R.C. � 61(a). The Supreme
Court has long recognized that the definition of gross
income sweeps broadly and reflects Congress' intent to
exert the full measure of its taxing power and to bring
within the definition of income any "accession to
wealth." United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 223
(1992), rev'g 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991). See also
Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 232 (1995). Ac-
cordingly, any receipt of funds or other accession to
wealth received by a taxpayer is presumed to be gross
income, unless the taxpayer can prove that the acces-
sion fits into a specific exclusion created by other
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