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sections of the Code. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-431 (1955). * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * There is no evidence that the assistance
payments were gifts. They were paid to persons and
businesses who were damaged by a product of du Pont.
As indicated by du Pont, their rough rule of thumb was
to make assistance payments of no more than one third
of the value of the damage caused. * * * The record
establishes that the petitioner was offered settlements
in excess of $500,000 and $900,000 in 1992. * * *
Clearly, du Pont and the petitioner recognized that du
Pont owed petitioner substantially more than the a-
mounts of the assistance payments. They were not
gifts, but partial compensation for the damage and made
in advance to mitigate against further consequential
loss by the petitioner.
As to the loan theory, du Pont never required
repayment. * * * The petitioner was destitute and his
only valuable asset was the cause of action against du
Pont. * * * None of the normal indicia of a loan are
present, no note, no repayment schedule, no interest,
and no security. * * * Clearly, the assistance payment
was partial payment in compensation for the damage done
by Benlate.
On the record before us, we agree with respondent that the
$150,000 assistance payment is income for 1992. During 1991, du
Pont realized that its fungicide Benlate may be responsible for
damage to plants, established a Benlate claims process, and
retained Crawford to work in the field to assist it in evaluating
alleged Benlate damage and processing claims for damage payment.
Beginning in 1991 and continuing into 1992, du Pont made as-
sistance payments to persons who filed claims with du Pont for
alleged damage due to Benlate. The intention of du Pont in
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