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and circumstances surrounding the $500,000 payment at issue in
that case in order to determine whether that payment was made on
account of personal injuries, as that term is used in section
104(a)(2). See id. at 311-314. We examined, inter alia, the
complaint that the Fabrys had filed against du Pont in the local
Florida Court and the mediation that preceded settlement of that
suit. See id. at 312-314. In that complaint, the Fabrys sought
damages on theories of negligence and strict liability in tort.
See id. at 313. They alleged as essential facts in that com-
plaint that the Benlate that they purchased was defective and
proved detrimental to their nursery products and that, as the
direct and proximate result of their use of Benlate, they suf-
fered, inter alia, damage to their business reputation. See id.
at 312-313. We pointed out in Fabry v. Commissioner, supra at
313, that nowhere in the complaint filed by the Fabrys did they
use the term "personal injuries" to describe the injuries that
they claimed to have suffered as a result of their use of Benlate
and that none of the other injuries alleged in the complaint
(i.e., plant damage, lost profits, or loss of going-concern
value) is a personal injury. We noted in Fabry that the Fabrys
did not argue, and we did not believe, that all injuries caused
by a defendant's negligence or attributable to a defendant under
a theory of strict liability in tort necessarily are personal
injuries within the meaning of section 104(a)(2). See id. at
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