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relevant facts and neither person compelled to buy or to sell.
See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973); Snyder
v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529, 539 (1989); Estate of Hall v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312, 335 (1989); see also Gillespie v.
United States, 23 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1994); Collins v.
Commissioner, 3 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo.
1992-478; sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs. The views of both
hypothetical persons must be taken into account, and the
characteristics of each hypothetical person may differ from the
personal characteristics of the actual seller or a particular
buyer. See Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999,
1005-1006 (5th Cir. 1981); Kolom v. Commissioner, 644 F.2d 1282,
1288 (9th Cir. 1981), affg. 71 T.C. 235 (1978); Estate of
Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 218 (1990). Focusing too
much on the view of one hypothetical person, to the neglect of
the view of the other, is contrary to a determination of fair
market value. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Commissioner,
supra; Estate of Scanlan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-331,
affd. without published opinion 116 F.3d 1476 (5th Cir. 1997);
Estate of Cloutier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-49. The
hypothetical willing buyer and the hypothetical willing seller
both aim to maximize their profit from the hypothetical sale of
the property. See Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 483,
486 (11th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-595; Estate of
Simplot v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. (1999).
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