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and procure for the intoxicated customer a room at a GBC hotel at
the reduced employee rate.
Respondent argues that the action that gave rise to the
sexual assault claim was not the procurement of the hotel room
but, rather, was petitioner's second visit to the hotel room, at
which time he and Ms. Doe were alone in the room.6 This second
visit, respondent contends, did not arise because of any business
activity of petitioner but, rather, was motivated strictly by
personal desires. Respondent argues additionally that, even
should the Court determine that the initial procurement of the
room was the action that gave rise to the sexual assault claim,
petitioner did not procure the room pursuant to GBC's elevator
policy but, rather, obtained the room in the hopes of engaging in
a romantic interlude with Ms. Doe or one of her companions.
In support of his position, petitioner relies primarily on
Clark v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958), in which this Court
held that the taxpayer's expenses incurred in the defense of a
criminal sexual assault charge, and amounts paid in settlement of
a civil claim for damages arising from an alleged sexual assault,
were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The
facts of Clark v. Commissioner, supra, are distinguishable from
the facts of this case. Petitioner's reliance in Clark is
misplaced.
6
Petitioner admits that he did make a second visit to the
hotel room, at which time he and Ms. Doe were alone. The details
of this second visit are discussed hereafter.
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