- 10 - and procure for the intoxicated customer a room at a GBC hotel at the reduced employee rate. Respondent argues that the action that gave rise to the sexual assault claim was not the procurement of the hotel room but, rather, was petitioner's second visit to the hotel room, at which time he and Ms. Doe were alone in the room.6 This second visit, respondent contends, did not arise because of any business activity of petitioner but, rather, was motivated strictly by personal desires. Respondent argues additionally that, even should the Court determine that the initial procurement of the room was the action that gave rise to the sexual assault claim, petitioner did not procure the room pursuant to GBC's elevator policy but, rather, obtained the room in the hopes of engaging in a romantic interlude with Ms. Doe or one of her companions. In support of his position, petitioner relies primarily on Clark v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958), in which this Court held that the taxpayer's expenses incurred in the defense of a criminal sexual assault charge, and amounts paid in settlement of a civil claim for damages arising from an alleged sexual assault, were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The facts of Clark v. Commissioner, supra, are distinguishable from the facts of this case. Petitioner's reliance in Clark is misplaced. 6 Petitioner admits that he did make a second visit to the hotel room, at which time he and Ms. Doe were alone. The details of this second visit are discussed hereafter.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Next
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