Henry F. K. Kersting - Page 12




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          Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166 (1988), affd. 904 F.2d 525 (9th              
          Cir. 1990), we stated that the "three-pronged rubric provided by            
          the Supreme Court in the Montana case embodies a number of                  
          detailed tests developed by the courts to test the                          
          appropriateness of collateral estoppel in essentially factual               
          contexts."  Building on the Supreme Court's analysis in Montana,            
          we identified five conditions that must be satisfied for                    
          collateral estoppel to apply:  First, the issue in the second               
          suit must be identical in all respects with the one decided in              
          the first suit; second, there must be a final judgment rendered             
          by a court of competent jurisdiction; third, collateral estoppel            
          may only be invoked against parties and their privities to the              
          prior judgment; fourth, the parties must have actually litigated            
          the issue and the resolution of these issues must have been                 
          essential to the prior decision; and fifth, the controlling facts           
          and applicable legal rules must remain unchanged from those in              
          the prior litigation.  See Peck v. Commissioner, supra at 166-              
          167; see also Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-600                 
          (1948); Gammill v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 607, 613-615 (1974).               
               Petitioner concedes Peck's five-prong analysis is                      
          satisfied.5  However, citing Montana's "special circumstances"              


               5 It is settled law that the District Court's judgment is              
          considered to be final for purposes of the application of                   
          collateral estoppel.  See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d             
                                                             (continued...)           




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