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intended to modify section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).4 Also, the
incorporation of the latter provision by section 6404(g) (and its
successor, section 6404(i)) has always been explicit. A careful
examination of the statute would have alerted petitioner to the
foregoing, in our view.
Petitioner further argues that the amendment to section
7430(c)(4)(D) correcting the erroneous reference to subparagraph
“(A)(iii)” gave insufficient notice that section 6404 was being
changed, thereby denying petitioner due process. Petitioner
first asserts that the retroactive application of the corrective
amendment would deny petitioner’s due process rights. Because
retroactive tax statutes have long been upheld, this argument
lacks merit. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31
(1994); Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930).
The retroactive application of a statute does not deny due
process so long as it is “supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means”. United States v. Carlton,
supra at 30-31. Clearly, the retroactive correction of section
7430(c)(4)(D) is justified by a rational legislative purpose in
that Congress merely acted to correct the obviously mistaken
reference to “subparagraph (A)(iii)” in the original version of
4 See H. Rept. 105-148 at 639 (1997). In its explanation of
sec. 7430(c)(4)(D), the House Committee on the Budget report
states that the “bill provides that the net worth limitations
currently applicable to individuals also apply to estates and
trusts.” Id.
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